Incentive Conflict for Slashing Path Pre-Sigged TX

[CedMaire]

babylon/docs/staking-script.md

Lines 245 to 249 in 6dbcf44

	- for stake to become active, staker must publish pre signed slashing transaction
	- covenant committee validates such transaction, and publish its own signatures.
	- the only signature missing to send slashing transaction is finality provider
	signature. If finality provider private key leaks due to infractions, anyone can
	sign slashing transaction and send slashing transaction to Bitcoin network.

I have a question about the slashing TX. The current design suggests that it must be pre-signed by the staker and covenant committee.

However, since the finality provider is the party that could be slashed in the event of misconduct, wouldn't we require their signature in the pre-signed TX? The finality provider would have no incentive to sign a TX that could result in their own punishment or that of their delegator. Shouldn't the slashing TX be pre-signed by the staker (and potentially the finality provider, but I don't see a reason) and then finalized by the covenant committee's signatures on bad behavior? This would ensure the slashing process is enforceable and there aren't conflicts of interest.

Can you clarify if I’m missing something here?