This repo is for review of requests for signing shim. To create a request for review:
- clone this repo
- edit the template below
- add the shim.efi to be signed
- add build logs
- add any additional binaries/certificates/SHA256 hashes that may be needed
- commit all of that
- tag it with a tag of the form "myorg-shim-arch-YYYYMMDD"
- push that to github
- file an issue at https://github.com/rhboot/shim-review/issues with a link to your branch
- approval is ready when you have accepted tag
Note that we really only have experience with using GRUB2 on Linux, so asking us to endorse anything else for signing is going to require some convincing on your part.
Here's the template:
baramundi software AG
baramundi Management Suite
What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it:
The SHIM bootloader starts a grub2 which decides if it should boot the local installed windows operating system or netboot a windows PE image. This is necessary to support remote operating system installation on clients in the LAN. With a signed SHIM bootloader we are able to support clients with enabled secure boot feature.
- Name: Simon Förg
- Position: Software Developer
- Email address: [email protected]
- PGP key, signed by the other security contacts, and preferably also with signatures that are reasonably well known in the linux community: CB1B 7D3A 6F0D 8CB8 5798 DF4F EB9C 0A29 123E D0BE
- Name: Felix Sauer
- Position: Software Developer
- Email address: [email protected]
- PGP key, signed by the other security contacts, and preferably also with signatures that are reasonably well known in the linux community: B7C0 FCA5 E582 FDF5 BEC2 796C 8010 5207 B17C 1CE6
Please create your shim binaries starting with the 15.4 shim release tar file: https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.4/shim-15.4.tar.bz2
This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 and contains the appropriate gnu-efi source.
Yes
We use https://github.com/rhboot/shim/tree/shim-15.4 without any changes. commit hash: 16eeafe28c552bca36953d75581500887631a7f1
None
If bootloader, shim loading is, GRUB2: is CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749, CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713, CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705, and if you are shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418
The grub2 sources we use have it's origin in the commit https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/grub2/tag/?h=applied/2.04-1ubuntu44 commit hash: eafade90898318c494b818af695e5c5c9fc75cc0
CVEs are fixed in this version.
What exact implementation of Secureboot in GRUB2 ( if this is your bootloader ) you have ?
- Upstream GRUB2 shim_lock verifier or * Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical like implementation ?
Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical
If bootloader, shim loading is, GRUB2, and previous shims were trusting affected by CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749, CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713, CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705, and if you were shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418 ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list ) grub2:
- were old shims hashes provided to Microsoft for verification and to be added to future DBX update ?
- Does your new chain of trust disallow booting old, affected by CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749, CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713, CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705, and if you were shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418 ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list ) grub2 builds ?
Yes
If your boot chain of trust includes linux kernel, is "efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down" upstream commit 1957a85b0032a81e6482ca4aab883643b8dae06e applied ? Is "ACPI: configfs: Disallow loading ACPI tables when locked down" upstream commit 75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354 applied ?
No linux kernel is used
If you use vendor_db functionality of providing multiple certificates and/or hashes please briefly describe your certificate setup. If there are allow-listed hashes please provide exact binaries for which hashes are created via file sharing service, available in public with anonymous access for verification
vendor_db not used, no binaries allow-listed.
If you are re-using a previously used (CA) certificate, you will need to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries to vendor_dbx in shim in order to prevent GRUB2 from being able to chainload those older GRUB2 binaries. If you are changing to a new (CA) certificate, this does not apply. Please describe your strategy.
No certificate got reused. The EV certificate used for the shim is new. No need for vendor_dbx entry.
What OS and toolchain must we use to reproduce this build? Include where to find it, etc. We're going to try to reproduce your build as close as possible to verify that it's really a build of the source tree you tell us it is, so these need to be fairly thorough. At the very least include the specific versions of gcc, binutils, and gnu-efi which were used, and where to find those binaries. If the shim binaries can't be reproduced using the provided Dockerfile, please explain why that's the case and the differences would be.
This information is provided in the Dockerfile of in this repository. https://github.com/baramundisoftware/shim-review/blob/master/Dockerfile
Which files in this repo are the logs for your build? This should include logs for creating the buildroots, applying patches, doing the build, creating the archives, etc.
https://github.com/baramundisoftware/shim-review/blob/master/shim_x64_build.log
shim_x64.efi MD5 Hash:
2AD3AD28458C81F210DD95150DDB8110