Improve GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87

advisories/github-reviewed/2024/11/GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87/GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87.json

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-p2h2-3vg9-4p87",
-  "modified": "2024-11-19T19:37:12Z",
+  "modified": "2024-11-19T19:37:13Z",
   "published": "2024-11-14T17:39:01Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2024-52308"
   ],
   "summary": "Connecting to a malicious Codespaces via GH CLI could allow command execution on the user's computer",
-  "details": "### Summary\n\nA security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow remote code execution (RCE) when users connect to a malicious Codespace SSH server and use the `gh codespace ssh` or `gh codespace logs` commands.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles SSH connection details when executing commands. When developers connect to remote Codespaces, they typically use a SSH server running within a devcontainer, often provided through the [default devcontainer image](https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration).  GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details](https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244), such as remote username, which is used in [executing `ssh` commands](https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263) for `gh codespace ssh` or `gh codespace logs` commands.\n\nThis exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects `ssh` arguments within the SSH connection details. `gh codespace ssh` and `gh codespace logs` commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like `-oProxyCommand=\"echo hacked\" #`.  The `-oProxyCommand` flag causes `ssh` to execute the provided command while `#` shell comment causes any other `ssh` arguments to be ignored.\n\nIn `2.62.0`, the remote username information is being validated before being used.\n\n### Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation, potentially compromising the user's data and system.\n\n### Remediation and Mitigation\n\n1. Upgrade `gh` to `2.62.0`\n2. Exercise caution when using custom devcontainer images, prefer default or pre-built devcontainers from trusted sources.",
+  "details": "### Note: The Edit suggestion has to do with the CPE assigned to this CVE. Here's the improvement suggestion I am making at the bottom:\n> Hi there! The CPE for this vulnerability is `cpe:2.3:a:github:cli:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*`, but the application is called `gh`. CVE/software-matching tools (e.g. FleetDM) will find the `gh` app but won't assign this CVE.\n> As a CNA, you could you update the CPE to include `cpe:2.3:a:github:gh:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*`.\nCheers!\n\n### Summary\n\nA security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow remote code execution (RCE) when users connect to a malicious Codespace SSH server and use the `gh codespace ssh` or `gh codespace logs` commands.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles SSH connection details when executing commands. When developers connect to remote Codespaces, they typically use a SSH server running within a devcontainer, often provided through the [default devcontainer image](https://docs.github.com/en/codespaces/setting-up-your-project-for-codespaces/adding-a-dev-container-configuration/introduction-to-dev-containers#using-the-default-dev-container-configuration).  GitHub CLI [retrieves SSH connection details](https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/30066b0042d0c5928d959e288144300cb28196c9/internal/codespaces/rpc/invoker.go#L230-L244), such as remote username, which is used in [executing `ssh` commands](https://github.com/cli/cli/blob/e356c69a6f0125cfaac782c35acf77314f18908d/pkg/cmd/codespace/ssh.go#L263) for `gh codespace ssh` or `gh codespace logs` commands.\n\nThis exploit occurs when a malicious third-party devcontainer contains a modified SSH server that injects `ssh` arguments within the SSH connection details. `gh codespace ssh` and `gh codespace logs` commands could execute arbitrary code on the user's workstation if the remote username contains something like `-oProxyCommand=\"echo hacked\" #`.  The `-oProxyCommand` flag causes `ssh` to execute the provided command while `#` shell comment causes any other `ssh` arguments to be ignored.\n\nIn `2.62.0`, the remote username information is being validated before being used.\n\n### Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's workstation, potentially compromising the user's data and system.\n\n### Remediation and Mitigation\n\n1. Upgrade `gh` to `2.62.0`\n2. Exercise caution when using custom devcontainer images, prefer default or pre-built devcontainers from trusted sources.",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V3",